Strategic voting in the context of stable-matching of teams
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Publication:6109546
DOI10.1007/978-3-031-15714-1_32zbMath1520.91265arXiv2207.04912OpenAlexW4296007966MaRDI QIDQ6109546
Sarit Kraus, Noam Hazon, Leora Schmerler
Publication date: 28 July 2023
Published in: Algorithmic Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2207.04912
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Cites Work
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- Strategic voting in the context of stable-matching of teams
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