EFX under budget constraint

DOI10.1007/978-3-031-20796-9_1zbMath1529.91050MaRDI QIDQ6111465

Li Ning, Yicheng Xu, Shengxin Liu, Sijia Dai, Boon Han Lim, Yong Zhang, Guichen Gao

Publication date: 3 August 2023

Published in: Frontiers of Algorithmic Wisdom (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

fair divisionbudget constraintenvy-free up to any goodmaximum Nash social welfare

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Cites Work

• Approximation algorithms for the selling with preference
• APX-hardness of maximizing Nash social welfare with indivisible items
• Offline and online algorithms for single-minded selling problem
• Maximum Nash welfare and other stories about EFX
• No justified complaints
• Approximating the Nash Social Welfare with Indivisible Items
• Consensus of Subjective Probabilities: The Pari-Mutuel Method
• The Nash Social Welfare Function
• A Little Charity Guarantees Almost Envy-Freeness
• Approximating Nash Social Welfare under Submodular Valuations through (Un)Matchings

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