A mechanism design approach for multi-party machine learning

DOI10.1007/978-3-031-20796-9_18zbMath1528.68338arXiv2001.08996OpenAlexW4313349433MaRDI QIDQ6111484

Pingzhong Tang, Yiheng Shen, Weiran Shen, Yang Liu, Mengjing Chen, Qiang Yang

Publication date: 3 August 2023

Published in: Frontiers of Algorithmic Wisdom (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2001.08996

zbMATH Keywords

mechanism designfederated learningincentive design

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Learning and adaptive systems in artificial intelligence (68T05) Privacy of data (68P27) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Cites Work

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