Inefficiency of pure Nash equilibria in series-parallel network congestion games
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Publication:6112015
DOI10.1007/978-3-031-22832-2_1OpenAlexW4312292320MaRDI QIDQ6112015
Publication date: 4 August 2023
Published in: Web and Internet Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-22832-2_1
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