On the centrality analysis of covert networks using games with externalities

DOI10.1016/j.ejor.2023.02.023OpenAlexW4321350343MaRDI QIDQ6112872

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Publication date: 10 July 2023

Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2023.02.023

zbMATH Keywords

multi-agent systemcooperative game theoryexternalitiesranking methodcovert network

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Operations research and management science (90Bxx)

Cites Work

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• Marginal Contributions and Externalities in the Value
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• AN AXIOM SYSTEM FOR A VALUE FOR GAMES IN PARTITION FUNCTION FORM

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