Information disclosure in all-pay contests with costly entry
DOI10.1007/s00182-022-00822-3zbMath1527.91085OpenAlexW4311628004MaRDI QIDQ6113208
Publication date: 10 July 2023
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-022-00822-3
discrete signalcostly entryrandomized information disclosure policystandard incomplete-information all-pay auctionsymmetric mixed strategy Nash equilibrium
Noncooperative games (91A10) 2-person games (91A05) Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Games with incomplete information, Bayesian games (91A27)
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Competitive bidding with entry costs
- Asymmetric all-pay auctions with interdependent valuations
- Equilibria in second price auctions with participation costs
- Auctions with entry
- Equilibria in first price auctions with participation costs
- Auction design with opportunity cost
- Entry and R{\&}D in procurement contracting
- Coordination in auctions with entry
- An analysis of the war of attrition and the all-pay auction
- The all-pay auction with complete information
- Asymmetric all-pay auctions with incomplete information: The two-player case
- Harnessing beliefs to optimally disclose contestants' types
- Auctioning risk: the all-pay auction under mean-variance preferences
- Disclosure policy in a multi-prize all-pay auction with stochastic abilities
- Contests with endogenous entry
- On disclosure policies in all-pay auctions with stochastic entry
- Information structures in optimal auctions
- Participation costs and efficient auctions
- A signaling model of peaceful political change
- Optimal auctions revisited
This page was built for publication: Information disclosure in all-pay contests with costly entry
