The structure of (local) ordinal Bayesian incentive compatible random rules
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Publication:6113812
DOI10.1007/s00199-022-01449-xzbMath1520.91156OpenAlexW3094268455MaRDI QIDQ6113812
Madhuparna Karmokar, Souvik Roy
Publication date: 9 August 2023
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/103494/1/MPRA_paper_103494.pdf
random social choice functions(local) dominant strategy incentive compatibility(local) ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibilityrandom Bayesian rules
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Cites Work
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