A topological proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111447arXiv2309.03123MaRDI QIDQ6117764

Joseph Root, Yu. Baryshnikov

Publication date: 20 March 2024

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2309.03123

zbMATH Keywords

social choicemechanism designtopological social choice

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Topological spaces and generalizations (closure spaces, etc.) (54A05) Social choice (91B14) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Cites Work

• Social choice and the topology of spaces of preferences
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• The equivalence of strong positive association and strategy-proofness
• Unifying impossibility theorems: A topological approach
• Arrow's theorem and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem: A unified approach
• Strategy-Proofness and Pivotal Voters: A Direct Proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• A quantitative gibbard-satterthwaite theorem without neutrality
• Another direct proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem
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