On the core of a patent licensing game

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2023.111374OpenAlexW4387142960MaRDI QIDQ6117815

Ryo Shirakawa, Satoshi Nakada

Publication date: 20 March 2024

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111374

zbMATH Keywords

core allocationimpossibility resultpatent licensing games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41)

Cites Work

• Stable bargaining outcomes in patent licensing: a cooperative game approach without side payments
• The kernel of a patent licensing game: the optimal number of licensees
• Bargaining outcomes in patent licensing: asymptotic results in a general Cournot market
• The Shapley value of a patent licensing game: the asymptotic equivalence to non-cooperative results
• Royalty licensing
• Stable profit sharing in a patent licensing game: General bargaining outcomes
• Cooperative games with coalition structures
• Fee versus royalty licensing in a Cournot duopoly model
• Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets of a patent licensing game: the existence proof
• Revenue royalties
• Farsighted stability in patent licensing: an abstract game approach
• On licensing policies in Bertrand competition
• General licensing schemes for a cost-reducing innovation
• Fee versus royalty reconsidered
• FEE VERSUS ROYALTY POLICY IN LICENSING THROUGH BARGAINING: AN APPLICATION OF THE NASH BARGAINING SOLUTION

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