Clustered bids in first-price auctions: collusion or competition?

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111393OpenAlexW4387709684MaRDI QIDQ6117824

Adriano De Leverano

Publication date: 20 March 2024

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111393

zbMATH Keywords

competitionauctionscomplete informationcollusion

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Bidder collusion
• Robust Screens for Noncompetitive Bidding in Procurement Auctions
• Using Bid Rotation and Incumbency to Detect Collusion: A Regression Discontinuity Approach

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