Holdup, search, and inefficiency
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Publication:611996
DOI10.1007/S00199-009-0471-ZzbMath1202.91117OpenAlexW2104298841MaRDI QIDQ611996
Publication date: 3 January 2011
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-009-0471-z
Search theory (90B40) Trade models (91B60) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
Related Items (1)
Cites Work
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- Creative bargaining
- Efficient non-contractible investments in large economies.
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- Delay in bargaining games with complete information
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- Renegotiation Design with Unverifiable Information
- Gradualism in Bargaining and Contribution Games
- A Stochastic Model of Sequential Bargaining with Complete Information
- Perfect Equilibria in a Negotiation Model
- Negative Externalities May Cause Delay in Negotiation
- Cyclical Delay in Bargaining with Externalities
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