Competitive screening in insurance markets with endogenous wealth heterogeneity

DOI10.1007/s00199-009-0481-xzbMath1202.91156OpenAlexW2119755960MaRDI QIDQ612002

Nick Netzer, Florian Scheuer

Publication date: 3 January 2011

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-009-0481-x

zbMATH Keywords

adverse selectioninsurance marketsmultidimensional screening

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Special types of economic equilibria (91B52) Economics of information (91B44) Heterogeneous agent models (91B69) Welfare economics (91B15)

Related Items (5)

Insurance contracts and financial markets ⋮ Adverse selection without single crossing: monotone solutions ⋮ Adverse selection in credit markets and regressive profit taxation ⋮ On signalling and screening in markets with asymmetric information ⋮ Limited liability and non-responsiveness in agency models

Cites Work

• Screening risk-averse agents under moral hazard: single-crossing and the CARA case
• A model of insurance markets with incomplete information
• Countervailing incentives in agency problems
• Equilibria and Pareto optimal of markets with adverse selection
• Ironing, Sweeping, and Multidimensional Screening
• Competitive Pooling: Rothschild-Stiglitz Reconsidered

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