Characterization of TU games with stable cores by nested balancedness
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Publication:6120896
DOI10.1007/s10107-021-01716-0OpenAlexW3210128231MaRDI QIDQ6120896
Michel Grabisch, Peter Sudhölter
Publication date: 21 February 2024
Published in: Mathematical Programming. Series A. Series B (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-02900564v1/file/20009.pdf
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