Characterization of TU games with stable cores by nested balancedness

DOI10.1007/s10107-021-01716-0OpenAlexW3210128231MaRDI QIDQ6120896

Michel Grabisch, Peter Sudhölter

Publication date: 21 February 2024

Published in: Mathematical Programming. Series A. Series B (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-02900564v1/file/20009.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

stable setcoredominationTU game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Linear programming (90C05)

Cites Work

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