A finite characterization of perfect equilibria

DOI10.1007/s10107-021-01746-8arXiv2111.01638OpenAlexW4205835032MaRDI QIDQ6120901

Ivonne Callejas, Srihari Govindan, Lucas Pahl

Publication date: 21 February 2024

Published in: Mathematical Programming. Series A. Series B (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2111.01638

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Real algebraic and real-analytic geometry (14P99) Equilibrium refinements (91A11)

Cites Work

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• Finding all Nash equilibria of a finite game using polynomial algebra
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• Perfect equilibrium and lexicographic beliefs
• Non-cooperative games
• Separation of real algebraic sets and the Łojasiewicz exponent
• Lexicographic Probabilities and Equilibrium Refinements
• Lectures on Resolution of Singularities (AM-166)
• The Algebraic Geometry of Perfect and Sequential Equilibrium
• On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
• Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept

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