Approximate and strategyproof maximin share allocation of chores with ordinal preferences

DOI10.1007/s10107-022-01855-yarXiv2012.13884OpenAlexW3113582020MaRDI QIDQ6120928

Haris Aziz, Bo Li, Xiaowei Wu

Publication date: 21 February 2024

Published in: Mathematical Programming. Series A. Series B (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2012.13884

zbMATH Keywords

ordinal preferencesstrategyproofnessfair allocationmaximin sharechores

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Approximation algorithms (68W25) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Randomized algorithms (68W20) Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

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• Approximation Algorithms for Computing Maximin Share Allocations
• Fair Enough
• Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods
• A Class of Sequential Games

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