New characterizations of strategy-proofness under single-peakedness

DOI10.1007/s10107-023-02010-xarXiv2102.11686OpenAlexW3131724968MaRDI QIDQ6120945

Clemens D. Puppe, Estelle M. Varloot, Andrew B. Jennings, Rida Laraki

Publication date: 21 February 2024

Published in: Mathematical Programming. Series A. Series B (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2102.11686

zbMATH Keywords

consistencyvotingstrategy-proofnesssingle-peaked preferencesproportionalityparticipationlinear/uniform median

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Strategy-proof probabilistic decision schemes for one-dimensional single-peaked preferences
• The structure of strategy-proof social choice. I: General characterization and possibility results on median spaces
• Concorcet's principle implies the no show paradox
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• Generalized median voter schemes and committees
• Efficient and strategy-proof voting rules: A characterization
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Social Choice Scoring Functions
• Straightforward Elections, Unanimity and Phantom Voters
• Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate
• Strategy-proofness implies minimal participation under single-peakedness

This page was built for publication: New characterizations of strategy-proofness under single-peakedness