Bank bailouts: moral hazard and commitment

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2024.102939OpenAlexW4391147866MaRDI QIDQ6121881

Khai Zhi Sim

Publication date: 26 March 2024

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.102939

zbMATH Keywords

moral hazardbank runsbailoutsfinancial regulations

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Financial networks (including contagion, systemic risk, regulation) (91G45)

Cites Work

• Optimal banking contracts and financial fragility
• A bank runs model with a continuum of types
• Herding and bank runs
• Run equilibria in the Green-Lin model of financial intermediation
• Bank incentives, contract design and bank runs
• Implementing efficient allocations in a model of financial intermediation
• Liquidity provision vs. deposit insurance: preventing bank panics without moral hazard
• Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity
• Dollarization, Bailouts, and the Stability of the Banking System
• Bailouts and Financial Fragility
• NOISY SUNSPOTS AND BANK RUNS
• Macroprudential Regulation versus mopping up after the crash

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