Detecting profitable deviations

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.102946OpenAlexW4391177926WikidataQ129455070 ScholiaQ129455070MaRDI QIDQ6121891

David M. Rahman

Publication date: 26 March 2024

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.102946

zbMATH Keywords

dualityimplementationmechanism design

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Cites Work

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• Characterization of Revenue Equivalence
• Existence of Correlated Equilibria
• Optimal Auction Design
• Groves' Scheme on Restricted Domains
• Mediated Partnerships
• Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets
• Convex Analysis
• The Construction of Utility Functions from Expenditure Data

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