Proportional clearing mechanisms in financial systems: an axiomatic approach
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Publication:6121893
DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.102955WikidataQ129455065 ScholiaQ129455065MaRDI QIDQ6121893
Pedro Calleja, Francesc Llerena
Publication date: 26 March 2024
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
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