On two mechanisms in job rotation problems

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.102959WikidataQ128331785 ScholiaQ128331785MaRDI QIDQ6121898

Yong-Chao Zhang, Yu Gu

Publication date: 26 March 2024

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

strategy-proofnessconstrained efficiencyjob rotationmodified top trading cycles mechanism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Cites Work

• Stable and efficient resource allocation under weak priorities
• House allocation with existing tenants
• On cores and indivisibility
• A market design approach to job rotation
• Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
• Strategy-proof tie-breaking in matching with priorities
• Incentive compatible allocation and exchange of discrete resources

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