COOPERATION IN THE WELL-MIXED TWO-POPULATION SNOWDRIFT GAME WITH PUNISHMENT ENFORCED THROUGH DIFFERENT MECHANISMS

DOI10.1142/S0219525917500102arXiv1609.07179OpenAlexW2526081361MaRDI QIDQ6121970

André Barreira da Silva Rocha

Publication date: 27 March 2024

Published in: Advances in Complex Systems (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1609.07179

zbMATH Keywords

replicator dynamicsagent-based simulationevolution of cooperationpunishmentsnowdrift game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Game theory, economics, finance, and other social and behavioral sciences (91-XX)

Cites Work

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• EFFECTS OF SPACE IN 2 × 2 GAMES

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