Selling information in competitive environments

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2023.105779arXiv2202.08780OpenAlexW4390116283MaRDI QIDQ6122064

Alessandro Bonatti, Munther A. Dahleh, Amir Nouripour, Thibaut Horel

Publication date: 27 March 2024

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2202.08780

zbMATH Keywords

competitiondatascreeningexternalitiesinformation design

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economics of information (91B44) Mechanism design theory (91B03) Games with incomplete information, Bayesian games (91A27)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• A monopolistic market for information
• Multidimensional mechanism design for auctions with externalities
• Robust Predictions in Games With Incomplete Information
• Direct and Indirect Sale of Information
• Optimal Auction Design
• Bayes correlated equilibrium and the comparison of information structures in games
• Equivalent Comparisons of Experiments
• Screening while controlling an externality

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