Mechanism design with belief-dependent preferences

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2023.105782OpenAlexW4390731905MaRDI QIDQ6122068

Ernesto Rivera Mora

Publication date: 27 March 2024

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2023.105782

zbMATH Keywords

revelation principlepsychological game theorybelief-dependent preferencesauctions with image concernsmechanism design with after-games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Individual preferences (91B08) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

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