Implementation in undominated strategies with applications to auction design, public good provision and matching

Public goods (91B18) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Matching models (91B68) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Cites Work

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Nash implementation with partially honest individuals
Dominant strategy implementation in economic environments
Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
Undominated Nash implementation in bounded mechanisms
Top dominance and the possibility of strategy-proof stable solutions to matching problems
Revisiting the foundations of dominant-strategy mechanisms
Implementation in undominated strategies by bounded mechanisms: the Pareto correspondence and a generalization
Implementation in undominated strategies with partially honest agents
(No) foundations of dominant-strategy mechanisms: a comment on Chung and Ely (2007)
Median stable matching for college admissions
Undominated strategies and coordination in normalform games
The Geometry of Fractional Stable Matchings and Its Applications
Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
Single-value combinatorial auctions and algorithmic implementation in undominated strategies
Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist when Demands are Interdependent
Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions
Optimal Auction Design
Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information
Implementation in Undominated Strategies: A Look at Bounded Mechanisms
Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
Robust mechanism design and dominant strategy voting rules
Implementation in Weakly Undominated Strategies: Optimality of Second-Price Auction and Posted-Price Mechanism: Figure 1
A Cognitive Hierarchy Model of Games
Strategically Simple Mechanisms
An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design
Many-to-One Stable Matching: Geometry and Fairness
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Implementation via Augmented Revelation Mechanisms
Maskin meets Abreu and Matsushima

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