Implementation in undominated strategies with applications to auction design, public good provision and matching
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Publication:6122069
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2023.105783MaRDI QIDQ6122069
Arunava Sen, Nozomu Muto, Saptarshi Mukherjee
Publication date: 27 March 2024
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
finite mechanismsimplementation in undominated strategiesoutperforming dominant-strategy implementation
Public goods (91B18) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Matching models (91B68) Mechanism design theory (91B03)
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