Shuttle diplomacy
From MaRDI portal
Publication:6122072
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2023.105794OpenAlexW4390782549MaRDI QIDQ6122072
Piero Gottardi, Claudio Mezzetti
Publication date: 27 March 2024
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2023.105794
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Mechanism design theory (91B03)
Cites Work
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