Monotone equilibrium in matching markets with signaling

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2024.105801arXiv2109.03370OpenAlexW4391561823WikidataQ128465988 ScholiaQ128465988MaRDI QIDQ6122080

Youngki Shin, Alex Sam, Seungjin Han

Publication date: 27 March 2024

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2109.03370

zbMATH Keywords

matchingmonotone signaling equilibriummonotone-supermodular conditionstronger monotone equilibriumstronger set order

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Matching models (91B68)

Cites Work

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• Pricing and investments in matching markets
• Signalling to Experts
• Selecting Cheap-Talk Equilibria
• Isotone Equilibrium in Games of Incomplete Information

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