Assortment by group founders always promotes the evolution of cooperation under global selection but can oppose it under local selection

DOI10.1007/s13235-023-00514-xMaRDI QIDQ6124782

Publication date: 2 April 2024

Published in: Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

diffusion approximation repeated prisoner's dilemma fixation probability one-third law of evolution coefficients of assortment local replicator dynamics

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Problems related to evolution (92D15) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Evolutionary games (91A22)

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