Complexity of behavioural strategies and cooperation in the optional public goods game
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Publication:6124784
DOI10.1007/s13235-022-00485-5OpenAlexW4313889277MaRDI QIDQ6124784
Simone Righi, Shirsendu Podder
Publication date: 2 April 2024
Published in: Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-022-00485-5
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