Maximal domains for strategy-proof pairwise exchange
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Publication:6125932
DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2023.10.004OpenAlexW4388209788MaRDI QIDQ6125932
Publication date: 9 April 2024
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2023.10.004
Individual preferences (91B08) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)
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