Information design and sensitivity to market fundamentals

DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2023.07.007OpenAlexW4385988601MaRDI QIDQ6125945

Pedro Guinsburg

Publication date: 9 April 2024

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2023.07.007

zbMATH Keywords

Bayesian persuasionoligopoliesinformation design

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economics of information (91B44) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Cites Work

• Duopoly information equilibrium: Cournot and Bertrand
• A general model of information sharing in oligopoly
• Robust Predictions in Games With Incomplete Information
• Competition in Persuasion
• What Happens When Wal-Mart Comes to Town: An Empirical Analysis of the Discount Retailing Industry
• Estimation of a Model of Entry in the Airline Industry
• Estimation of Discrete Games with Weak Assumptions on Information

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