Trustworthy sealed-bid auction with low communication cost atop blockchain

DOI10.1016/j.ins.2023.02.069OpenAlexW4322625914WikidataQ121362048 ScholiaQ121362048MaRDI QIDQ6126676

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Publication date: 9 April 2024

Published in: Information Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ins.2023.02.069

zbMATH Keywords

auctionzero knowledge proofblockchainsmart contractcryptographic commitment

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cryptography (94A60) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

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