Environmental policy à la carte: letting firms choose their regulation

DOI10.1016/J.JEEM.2010.07.001zbMath1202.91250OpenAlexW2081198802MaRDI QIDQ612734

Frank C. Krysiak, Iris Maria Oberauner

Publication date: 29 December 2010

Published in: Journal of Environmental Economics and Management (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://edoc.unibas.ch/61505/1/20180307142542_5a9fe8565c421.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

uncertaintyasymmetric informationscreeningenvironmental policyprices-versus-quantities

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)

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Cites Work

• Optimal mix of emissions taxes and cap-and-trade
• Dynamic environmental policy with strategic firms: Prices versus quantities.
• Regulating stock externalities under uncertainty.
• On Imperfect Information and Optimal Pollution Control
• To Tell the Truth: Imperfect Information and Optimal Pollution Control
• Monopoly, Non-Linear Pricing and Imperfect Information: The Insurance Market
• Pollution control by options trading

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