Reputation incentives with public supervision promote cooperation in evolutionary games

DOI10.1016/j.amc.2023.128445OpenAlexW4388750820MaRDI QIDQ6128645

Xingwen Liu, Qi Hu, Yulian Jiang, Tao Jin

Publication date: 16 April 2024

Published in: Applied Mathematics and Computation (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.amc.2023.128445

zbMATH Keywords

evaluationevolutionary gameprisoner's dilemma gamepublic supervisionreputation incentive mechanism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Game theory (91Axx) Mathematical economics (91Bxx) Mathematical sociology (including anthropology) (91Dxx)

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