Hotelling-Downs equilibria: moving beyond plurality variants
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Publication:6130922
DOI10.1007/978-3-031-07996-2_1OpenAlexW4285227895MaRDI QIDQ6130922
Omer Lev, Alexander Karpov, Svetlana Obraztsova
Publication date: 3 April 2024
Published in: Group Decision and Negotiation: Methodological and Practical Issues (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-07996-2_1
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