Screening with privacy on (im)persistency

DOI10.1515/BEJTE-2022-0118OpenAlexW4381188994MaRDI QIDQ6131128

Alice Peng-Ju Su

Publication date: 4 April 2024

Published in: The B. E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2022-0118

zbMATH Keywords

ratchet effectincentive compatible contractsdynamic screeningprivacy on evolving preference

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08) Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41) Principal-agent models (91B43)

Cites Work

• A note on the dynamics of incentive contracts
• On the optimality of privacy in sequential contracting
• Contracting with a naïve time-inconsistent agent: to exploit or not to exploit?
• Dynamic screening with limited commitment
• Price experimentation with strategic buyers
• Ex post information rents in sequential screening
• Contracting with imperfect commitment and noisy communication
• Sequential Screening
• Sequentially Optimal Mechanisms1
• The Dynamics of Incentive Contracts
• Contracting with Imperfect Commitment and the Revelation Principle: The Single Agent Case
• Progressive Screening: Long-Term Contracting with a Privately Known Stochastic Process
• Dynamic Mechanism Design: A Myersonian Approach
• Contracting with Diversely Naive Agents

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