Financial and operational creditors in bankruptcy resolution: a general equilibrium approach under three game-theoretic division rules with an application to India
DOI10.1515/bejte-2023-0031OpenAlexW4387017753MaRDI QIDQ6131136
Publication date: 4 April 2024
Published in: The B. E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2023-0031
general equilibriumIndiafinancial creditorsgame-theoretic bankruptcy division rulesoperational creditors
Noncooperative games (91A10) Applications of game theory (91A80) General equilibrium theory (91B50) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)
Cites Work
- Game theoretic analysis of a bankruptcy problem from the Talmud
- The bankruptcy problem: A cooperative bargaining approach
- The three musketeers: four classical solutions to bankruptcy problems.
- Trade Credit and the Propagation of Corporate Failure: An Empirical Analysis
- Default and Punishment in General Equilibrium1
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