Key-schedule security for the TLS 1.3 standard

DOI10.1007/978-3-031-22963-3_21zbMath1519.94067OpenAlexW3201732747MaRDI QIDQ6135414

Chris Brzuska, Markulf Kohlweiss, Cédric Fournet, Konrad Kohbrok, Christoph Egger, Antoine Delignat-Lavaud

Publication date: 25 August 2023

Published in: Advances in Cryptology – ASIACRYPT 2022 (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://hal-cnrs.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-03969623

zbMATH Keywords

protocol analysiskey scheduleTLS 1.3state-separating proofs

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cryptography (94A60)

Related Items (2)

Key-schedule security for the TLS 1.3 standard ⋮ When messages are keys: is HMAC a dual-PRF?

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• New proofs for NMAC and HMAC: security without collision resistance
• PRF-ODH: relations, instantiations, and impossibility results
• Authenticated confidential channel establishment and the security of TLS-DHE
• State separation for code-based game-playing proofs
• Analysing and exploiting the Mantin biases in RC4
• A cryptographic analysis of the TLS 1.3 handshake protocol
• On the tight security of TLS 1.3: theoretically sound cryptographic parameters for real-world deployments
• Tighter proofs for the SIGMA and TLS 1.3 key exchange protocols
• Proving the TLS Handshake Secure (As It Is)
• Data Is a Stream: Security of Stream-Based Channels
• Augmented Secure Channels and the Goal of the TLS 1.3 Record Layer
• Cryptographic Extraction and Key Derivation: The HKDF Scheme
• Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO 2003
• Key-schedule security for the TLS 1.3 standard

This page was built for publication: Key-schedule security for the TLS 1.3 standard