Optimal and Efficient Auctions for the Gradual Procurement of Strategic Service Provider Agents
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Publication:6135966
DOI10.1613/jair.1.14126MaRDI QIDQ6135966
Farzaneh Farhadi, Nicholas R. Jennings, Maria Chli
Publication date: 28 August 2023
Published in: Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
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