Walrasian pricing in multi-unit auctions

DOI10.1016/j.artint.2023.103961MaRDI QIDQ6136100

Simina Brânzei, Yulong Zeng, Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Peter Bro Miltersen

Publication date: 28 August 2023

Published in: Artificial Intelligence (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2017/8119/

zbMATH Keywords

approximationmulti-unit auctionsmechanism designsocial welfarerevenue

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Artificial intelligence (68Txx)

Cites Work

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