Double implementation in dominant strategy equilibria and ex-post equilibria with private values

DOI10.1515/BEJTE-2021-0115zbMath1521.91096OpenAlexW2954084478MaRDI QIDQ6136264

Makoto Hagiwara

Publication date: 29 August 2023

Published in: The B. E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://www.rieb.kobe-u.ac.jp/academic/ra/dp/English/DP2019-13.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

double implementationprivate valuesex-post equilibriumdominant strategy equilibriumweak secure-strategy-proofness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Cites Work

• Bounded depths of rationality and implementation with complete information
• Secure implementation in Shapley-Scarf housing markets
• Ex post implementation
• On cores and indivisibility
• School choice: an experimental study
• The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility
• Implementation in Dominant Strategies under Complete and Incomplete Information
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Robust Mechanism Design
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage

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