Bargaining under almost complete information
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Publication:6139978
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2023.105758OpenAlexW4387826537MaRDI QIDQ6139978
Publication date: 19 January 2024
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2023.105758
2-person games (91A05) Applications of game theory (91A80) History, political science (91F10) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
Cites Work
- Tough negotiations: bilateral bargaining with durable commitments
- Bargaining with imperfect commitment
- No compromise: uncertain costs in reputational bargaining
- Reputational Bargaining With Minimal Knowledge of Rationality
- Bargaining Under Two-Sided Incomplete Information: The Unrestricted Offers Case
- Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
- Alternating-Offer Bargaining with Two-Sided Incomplete Information
- Bargaining and Reputation
- One-sided uncertainty and delay in reputational bargaining
- Robust Predictions in Infinite-Horizon Games--an Unrefinable Folk Theorem
- Bargaining and Reputation in Search Markets
- Private Politics and Public Regulation
- Reputational Bargaining and Deadlines
- Alternating-offer bargaining with the global games information structure
- Bargaining with Two-sided Incomplete Information: An Infinite Horizon Model with Alternating Offers
- Uncertainty about Uncertainty and Delay in Bargaining
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