Close-knit neighborhoods: stability of cooperation in networks
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Publication:6139989
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2023.105775OpenAlexW4389956036MaRDI QIDQ6139989
Publication date: 19 January 2024
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2023.105775
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