Complete-rent-dissipation contest design
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Publication:6140013
DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2023.111346zbMath1530.91023OpenAlexW4386513397MaRDI QIDQ6140013
Publication date: 19 January 2024
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111346
contest success functioncomplete rent dissipationequivalence in aggregate efforts across equilibriaobservable or unobservable values
Cites Work
- Favoritism in asymmetric contests: head starts and handicaps
- Tullock contests may be revenue superior to auctions in a symmetric setting
- Revenue ranking of optimally biased contests: the case of two players
- The all-pay auction with complete information
- Effort maximization in asymmetric contest games with heterogeneous contestants
- Biased contests for symmetric players
- Contests with small noise and the robustness of the all-pay auction
- Lottery versus all-pay auction contests: a revenue dominance theorem
- DISCRIMINATION IN A MODEL OF CONTESTS WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION ABOUT ABILITY
- Performance‐maximizing large contests
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