Iterated bounded dominance
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Publication:6140028
DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111360zbMath1530.91080OpenAlexW4386885355MaRDI QIDQ6140028
Xuewen Qian, Yue-Da Hsieh, Chen Qu
Publication date: 19 January 2024
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111360
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