Set-theoretic justification and the theoretical virtues

DOI10.1007/s11229-020-02784-zzbMath1529.03050OpenAlexW3043345016MaRDI QIDQ6142447

John Heron

Publication date: 26 January 2024

Published in: Synthese (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://philarchive.org/rec/HERSJA

zbMATH Keywords

Russellset theoryabductive inferenceGödeljustificationtheoretical virtuesaxiom choicePenelope Maddy

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Philosophy of mathematics (00A30) Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05) Axiom of choice and related propositions (03E25)

Cites Work

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• What inductive explanations could not be
• Objectivity, ambiguity, and theory choice
• Because Without Cause
• Science without Numbers
• What is Absolute Undecidability?†
• Foreword to Special Issue on Mathematical Depth
• Afterword to Special Issue on Mathematical Depth
• The Philosophy of Mathematical Practice
• Why proofs by mathematical induction are generally not explanatory
• Simplicity, Inference and Modelling
• On Forms of Justification in Set Theory
• Defending Maddy’s Mathematical Naturalism from Roland’s Criticisms: The Role of Mathematical Depth
• WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS TO BE SELF-EVIDENT: BUT WHAT DO WE MEAN BY THAT?
• Defending the Axioms

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