Realism, reliability, and epistemic possibility: on modally interpreting the Benacerraf-Field challenge

DOI10.1007/S11229-020-02984-7zbMath1529.03098OpenAlexW3114428956MaRDI QIDQ6142497

Brett Topey

Publication date: 26 January 2024

Published in: Synthese (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-020-02984-7

zbMATH Keywords

Platonismmodal epistemologyreliability challengecounterpossibles

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05) Logics of knowledge and belief (including belief change) (03B42)

Cites Work

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• Impossible worlds: A modest approach
• Williamson on counterpossibles
• Epistemology versus non-causal realism
• Counterpossibles
• Remarks on counterpossibles
• Mathematics, Morality, and Self‐Effacement
• Modal Objectivity1

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