Strategic transmission of imperfect information: why revealing evidence (without proof) is difficult
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Publication:6142576
DOI10.1007/S00182-023-00848-1zbMath1530.91086OpenAlexW4362466067MaRDI QIDQ6142576
Publication date: 4 January 2024
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-023-00848-1
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