Bounded incentives in manipulating the probabilistic serial rule
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Publication:6142601
DOI10.1016/j.jcss.2023.103491arXiv2001.10640OpenAlexW4387967756MaRDI QIDQ6142601
Zihe Wang, Zhide Wei, Jie Zhang, Haoqiang Huang
Publication date: 4 January 2024
Published in: Journal of Computer and System Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2001.10640
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