The lattice of envy-free many-to-many matchings with contracts

DOI10.1007/s11238-023-09940-0arXiv2206.10758OpenAlexW4378652701MaRDI QIDQ6145086

Jorge A. Oviedo, Noelia Juarez, Pablo Neme, Nadia Guiñazú, Agustín G. Bonifacio

Publication date: 30 January 2024

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2206.10758

zbMATH Keywords

latticematching with contractsenvy-freenessvacancy chainTarski operatorre-equilibration process

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Matching models (91B68) Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41)

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