Exchange of indivisible goods under matroid constraints
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Publication:6145529
DOI10.1016/j.ic.2023.105110MaRDI QIDQ6145529
Bo Tang, Jinshan Zhang, Jianwei Yin
Publication date: 2 February 2024
Published in: Information and Computation (Search for Journal in Brave)
Cites Work
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